THE NEW OHIO GENERAL CORPORATION ACT
Ohio has enacted a new General Corporation Act,' in the
preparation of which such unusual pains have been taken and so
many experts consulted, and which is also so modern and complete that every person interested in corporation law should study
it. The Act is more than a codification of existing law in one
state; it reaches into fields where legislators and courts have so
far only felt their way; it contains innovations; and it deserves a
treatise. In this note, however, space and time allow mention
only of some of its more interesting features.
Of these, perhaps the most striking is the careful adjustment
of the institution of stock having no par value, allowed by the
Act, to proper accounting and financing. Every corporation
must have and carry on its books a "stated capital" (Section 37),
which in the case of stock without par value includes the consideration received for its outstanding shares and its treasury shares.
This "stated capital" is as public, as easy to ascertain by all concerned, and as important as a measuring rod to determine shareholders' obligations, the right to declare dividends, directors'
liability, etc., as "capital stock," that is, number of shares
multiplied by par value of each, used to be in days before no par
stock (Sections 4, 37, 38, 39, 63, 124). Stock without par value
cannot be carried on the books in such a way as to conceal or
exaggerate the initial investment. 2 In this same connection the
Act adopts and enacts sound accounting principles. 3 For example, the problem of determining whether a dividend is or is not
payable does not turn on judicial interpretation of indeterminate
words such as "surplus" and "profits"; instead, the Act prescribes
in effect the items to be included in the corporate balance sheet,
"An act to revise, consolidate and codify the general corporation laws of
Ohio and to repeal certain sections of the General *Code," passed by Ohio General Assembly, February i6, 1927, approved March 8, 1927, effective June 9, 1927.
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and these must be taken care of by the directors (Section 38).
To illustrate: allowance must be made for depreciation and
depletion, 4 deferred assets and prepaid expenses must be written
off from time to time, unrealized appreciations based on revaluations cannot be made the basis for cash dividends, surplus arising or created in this way must be carried on the books separate
from surplus profits and paid-in surplus (see Section 23), and
books showing these facts are open to inspection by shareholders
(Section 63; see Section 64). Some business men may feel that
a corporation competing with rivals is made to give away too
much, but from the shareholder's point of view this is admirable.
In another respect the Act favors shareholders more, perhaps, than is usual. A creditor who seeks to charge a shareholder for stock issued at an overvaluation must "affirmatively
prove by clear and convincing evidence, and otherwise than by
proving the difference between the value of such considerations
and the amount so determined, that such determination of value
was knowingly and intentionally made and fixed at an amount
known to the parties making the same to be greater than the fair
value of such considerations to the corporation." (Section 25.)
"Determinations" will ordinarily be made by directors and must
be entered on the books of account. The "consideration" in the
case of shares with par value is the par value (Section 16),5
and in the case of shares without par value is as specified in the
articles, or if not there specified, as determined by the shareholders concerned, or by the directors if so authorized by the
Articles or by the shareholders (Section 17). If, however, the
shareholder is liable, he is liable to the corporation (Sections 22,
24), and an individual creditor may proceed by a bill to reach and
apply (Section 28). In brief, his liability is not entirely predicated on a theory of "holding out" nor on the "trust fund theory,"
'A corporation may be a "wasting assets" corporation only if so stated in its
Articles (Section 38, ad fin.). See also The Rights of Stockholders Preferred
as to Capital to Safeguard Their Interests in a Corporation, 75 U. OF PA. L.
RLV. 350 (i927).
'The rule of Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417 (i8gi), is enacted in this section in a broadened form. Any corporation more than two years old may issue
par shares at less than par if the directors find shares cannot be sold at par and
give shareholders a preemptive right.
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but borrows from both, is sui generis, and seems easy of application with no unexpected pitfalls either for shareholder or creditor.
On the other hand the provisions of the Act as to the socalled preEmptive right seem unfortunate from the point of view
of the shareholder. Section 35 declares in effect that the holders
of shares of any class have the right upon the sale for cash of
shares of the same class to purchase such shares in proportion to
their respective holdings of shares of such class. The section
then provides that the right shall not exist in certain situations.
The propriety of some of these may perhaps be questioned, but
there is no space to do so here. It is the main part of the section
which principally calls for comment. It is submitted that the Act
confuses two distinct sorts of harm that may be done to a shareholder," unduly and unreasonably limits his rights in connection
with both, and also gives him a right when he does not need it.
A shareholder with voting power is harmed by a new issue of
shares with voting power when he is given no opportunity to
subscribe and thereby to preserve his proportionate voting
strength. A shareholder, with or without voting power, is also
harmed when his financial interest in the corporation's assets or
earning power is altered to his disadvantage by a new issue; nor in
such case will an opportunity to subscribe wholly obviate the
harm. Two hypothetical cases will show the difference between
these two sorts of harm:
(i) A corporation with IooO authorized outstanding voting
shares, par, book and market value all $ioo, authorizes and issues
iooo new voting shares, par value $ioo, but deferred as to capital
and dividends, and therefore of a different "class," without giving
old shareholders an opportunity' to subscribe. A, owning IOO
shares of the old issue, had a io per cent. voting strength in the
affairs of the -company before, and only a 5 per cent. voting
strength after the new issue. The first of the two harms above
This is shown by the fact that the drafters of the Act in their note to
this section refer to 5 FLETCHER, CYC. OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, § 3462, relating mostly to the first sort of harm and to A. A. Berle, Jr., 25 COLUmBIA L. REV.
43, 56 et seq. (1924), and Hodgman v. Atlantic Refining Co., 3oo Fed. 590 (D.
C. Del., 1924), relating to the second.
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mentioned has been done him, but the new issue being of a different "class," the section gives him no rights. The consideration for the new issue is, of course, immaterial here.
(2) Suppose the old issue was of no par value, but otherwise the same and that the new was of iooo non-voting shares,
not deferred as to capital or dividends, also of no par value, and
that the consideration was $5o,ooo. The first harm is not done
A but the second one is. Again the section gives A no preEmptive
right. The new issue being non-voting is of a different "class."
Even if A were given a preEmptive right, he would by subscribing
7
at best merely minimize and not obviate his damage.
A third situation illustrates the curious working of Section
35. Suppose the first issue were of non-voting shares, book, par,
and market value $ioo; and that the new issue, exactly similar, is
sold at $ioo without giving A an opportunity to subscribe. The
section gives him a preemptive right although no harm is done
him.
Cases that might well be omitted are therefore included and
cases that ought to be included or otherwise provided for are left
out. This is partly because the preemptive right is limited to
shares of the same class and partly because the second sort of
harm is not wholly cured by giving a preEmptive right, It ought
to be obvious that classification of shares in connection with prefSA preEmptive right will not prevent A's transferring some of the value
that his shares represent to new shareholders. If he transfers this value to himself (as will happen only when he is allowed to and does subscribe to a proportion of the new issue equal to his proportion of the old), he may, it is true,
maintain his proportionate financial interest in the corporation. But should he
be required to pay money to protect himself ? It may be granted that a shareholder who wishes to preserve his proportionate voting strength is only privileged to do so upon the payment of new money, but it is a different thing to make
a man pay new money or else suffer a loss. The sort of case illustrated is likely
to arise: (I) Where the new issue goes to an "insider" (see Hodgman v. Atlantic Refining Co., supra note 6, but cf., also, 13 F. (2d) 78, (C. C. A. 9th,
1926), in which case general principles may be sufficient to protect him (see A.
A. Berle, Jr., 25 COLUMBiA L. REV. 43, 56, 6o (1924) ; 39 HARV. L. REv. 673
(1926) ; Bodell v.General Gas & Electric Corp., I32 Atl. 442 (Del. Ch. 1926),
(2)
Where there are issues of different classes with varying preferences. Under § i6, A has, for what it is worth, a preEmptive right as to new issues with
par value, but only if they are sold for less than par. He does not have that
right if the new issue is sold for par and is of a different class, even though his
shares were worth per share more than par of the new issue.
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erences or deferments as to capital or dividends, etc., has nothing
to do with the first sort of harm above mentioned provided both
issues are of voting shares. If voting power is to be protected,
all voting shares, subject to certain established restrictions more
or less logical, 8 should have a preemptive right in all new issues
of voting shares whatever their class otherwise may be. The
second sort of harm presents greater difficulties. The financial
needs of the corporation as a whole are often such that a shareholder can fairly be called upon to endure a certain diminution
in his financial interest. He must make a sacrifice in order to
draw in new capital. All new issues, however, ought to be reasonable not only with regard to their effect on the corporation as
a whole but with regard to their particular effect upon each previous issue. The Act is not wholly silent on this subject. For
example,9 in connection with non-par shares, a corporation may
peddle out such shares, even of the same class, for different considerations, provided that if the shares are of the same class
shares issued at the same time must be issued for the same consideration; but even though this.may be done in a fashion that
alters a shareholder's financial interest very much to his disadvantage, nevertheless the shareholder is not without some protection in advance. Unless the Articles vest power in the directors,
the consideration for the new issue must be fixed by the affirmative vote of a majority of the outstanding shares of the class to
be issued and of junior classes, irrespective of voting power (Section 17). Is this protection sufficient, particularly in cases where
the Articles vest in the directors power to fix the consideration
for new issues? The argument that the shareholder, having
bought shares in a corporation where the directors have power to
alter the value of his investment, must take his medicine does not
appeal to the writer of this note at any rate. If those who fix the
value of the onsideration have an unimpeachable discretion, the
shareholder ought at least to have the. right to have his shares
bought by the corporation at their value before the new issue was
'As, for example, when the new issue is transferred for property.
'As to shares with par value, the consideration must be at par or more except as stated in note 5 supra. See note 7 supra.
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consummated. He has a right to compel the corporation to buy
him out in some cases but not in this one (Section 72).1 ° If the
discretion of shareholders and directors is impeachable on the
ground of unfair discrimination against particular issues, the Act
might well have said so and not have left it to possible inference.,'
This is the only matter in which the writer feels moved to
waste his eloquence in adverse citicism. The Act as a whole and
in its many parts is so admirable that he is disarmed.
The part of the Act most likely to excite comment deals
boldly with the vexed problem of ultra vires acts. "No limitation
on the exercise of the authority of the corporation shall be
asserted in any action between the corporation and any person,
except by or on behalf of the corporation against a director or an
officer or a person having actual knowledge of such limitation"
(Section 8). Nor is any person charged with constructive notice
of limitations on its authority appearing in its articles (Section
9). The drafters of the Act state largely that this "expresses
the best business and legal thought"

.

.

.

and "makes the law

of corporate power definite, direct and certain, obviating a disgraceful legal situation which had no basis in history, came into
the law by mistake, and remained to plague business men and
lawyers for nearly a hundred years." 12
When the section comes up for interpretation in court, it
may be hoped that the phrase "authority of the corporation" will
not be construed to cover also "authority of the agents of the corporation." Otherwise a corporation (and therefore its shareholders) will have less protection than the ordinary principal
when his agent acts in an unauthorized manner. There also
arises some question as to whether directors are ever agents who
10 If the discrimination is effected by amendments to the Articles inserting
new prior issues ahead of that of an objecting shareholder, he may compel the
corporation to purchase his shares at their old value (§§ 15, 72).
'It is suggested that a court might justify issues because reasonable as to
the corporation as a whole but not reasonable in their application to particular
groups of shareholders. Again, an Ohio Court, because of the completeness of
the Act might find an intent therein not to give any additional remedy based on
the fiduciary duties of consideration fixing agencies. See Bodell v. General Gas
& Electric Corporation, 132 Atl. 442 (Del. Ch. 1926) ; Berle, op. cit. supra.
" See Ultra Vires as a Defense to Executory Contract Made by Corporation in Violation of Statutory Prohibition, 75 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 454 (1927).
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can act outside the scope of their authority. All the capacity of
a corporation and all its power and authority are vested in them,
unless vested somewhere else by the Act or by the Articles (Section 55). Suppose the directors purport to do an act authority
to do which is not vested in them. When will a corporation be
liable? On this subject, so closely akin to the subject of true
ultra vires and so often confused with it, the Act is silent.
It is somewhat to be regretted that the drafters did not
choose to make the rules as to de facto corporations as "definite,
direct and certain" as those relating to ultra vires acts. A copy
of the articles filed in the proper place is only prima facie evidence
of the existence of the corporation named therein (Section 117).
Upon such filing corporate existence begins (Section 7), but does
de jure existence begin when defective articles are filed?
There are many other features of the Act that repay study
and justify comment, but neither time nor space permits their
inclusion here.
Austin Tappan Wright.
University of PennsylvaniaLaw School.

